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Abstract 
What role do cognitive control regions like the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) play in 
normative behavior (e.g., generosity, healthy eating)? Some models suggest that dlPFC 
activation during normative choice reflects the use of control to overcome default hedonistic 
preferences. Here, we develop an alternative account, showing that an attribute-based neural 
drift diffusion model (anDDM) predicts trial-by-trial variation in dlPFC response across three 
fMRI studies and two self-control contexts (altruistic sacrifice and healthy eating). Using the 
anDDM to simulate a variety of self-control dilemmas generated a novel prediction: although 
dlPFC activity might typically increase for norm-consistent choices, deliberate self-regulation 
focused on normative goals should decrease or even reverse this pattern (i.e., greater dlPFC 
response for hedonic, self-interested choices). We confirmed these predictions in both altruistic 
and dietary choice contexts. Our results suggest that dlPFC’s response during normative choice 
may depend more on value-based evidence accumulation than inhibition of our baser instincts.
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Introduction. 
Self-control dilemmas typically involve trade offs between short-term, hedonic considerations 
and longer-term or more abstract standards and values. For example, social interactions often 
force an individual to weigh self-interest against norms favoring equity and other-regard. 
Similarly, dietary decisions often require weighing the immediate pleasure of consumption 
against personal standards or societal norms favoring healthy eating. Understanding when, why, 
and how people choose normatively-preferred responses (e.g., generosity over selfishness, 
healthy over unhealthy eating, etc.) has represented a central goal of the decision sciences for 
decades. What neural and computational processes must be engaged to support more normative 
behavior? What makes such choices frequently feel so conflicted and effortful, and how can we 
make them easier? To what extent does following social or personal norms depend on activation 
in brain regions associated with cognitive control, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(dlPFC)? 
 
Previous research has provided a wealth of evidence suggesting that the dlPFC may promote 
more normative choices in both the social and non-social domain. For instance, compared to 
unhealthy food choices, healthier choices in successful dieters were accompanied by greater 
activation in a posterior region of the dlPFC1. Greater dlPFC response in a similar region has 
also been observed when individuals make normatively-favored choices in both social decision 
making2,3 and intertemporal choice4,5. Moreover, activation in the dlPFC increases when 
individuals explicitly focus on eating healthy6 or on decreasing craving for food7. Electrical 
disruption of this area also decreases patience8 and reduces normative behavior in social contexts 
like the Ultimatum game9. Collectively, these results support the notion that the dlPFC may be 
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recruited to modulate values or bias choices in favor of normative responses, perhaps especially 
when those responses conflict with default preferences. 
 
Yet a variety of results seem inconsistent with this view. For example, researchers often fail to 
observe increased dlPFC recruitment when individuals make pro-social or intertemporally 
normative choices10-12. Moreover, electrical disruption of the dlPFC has been observed both to 
decrease appetitive valuation of foods13, and increase generous behavior in the Dictator Game9. 
Such findings conflict with the idea that this region consistently promotes normative concerns 
over immediate, hedonistic desires. Thus, how to predict whether and when one might observe a 
positive association between dlPFC response and choices typically associated with successful 
self-control remains unclear. 
 
Here, we propose a computational account of fMRI BOLD response in the dlPFC that may 
resolve many of these apparent inconsistencies. This account draws on prior research in both 
perceptual and value-based decision making, which consistently finds that the posterior dlPFC 
region associated with normative “self-control success” also activates during choices that are 
more difficult to discriminate in simple perceptual and value-based choices lacking a self-control 
conflict, e.g., 14-16. Our account is also inspired by findings that the dlPFC may be one hub in a 
larger neural circuit (encompassing additional regions like the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 
[dACC], supplementary motor area [SMA] and inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula [IFG/aIns]) 
that selects actions for execution using a process of evidence accumulation and lateral inhibition 
among competing action representations17,18. Based on this evidence, we developed a 
computational model of self-control dilemmas that successfully predicts not only when an 
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individual will choose in normative rather than hedonistic fashion, but also when, why, and to 
what degree response in the dlPFC will be recruited during that process. We note also that, 
although we focus here on the dlPFC, our model also applies in theory when observing similar 
relationships to other brain areas frequently associated with conflict and cognitive control, 
including regions of the IFG/aIns and dACC. 
 
As with similar models of simple perceptual and value-based choices, our attribute-based neural 
drift diffusion model (anDDM) assumes that the brain makes decisions through a process of 
value-based attribute integration and competition (Figure 1). More specifically, choices are 
resolved via competitive interactions between neuronal populations that output responses based 
on accumulated information about the value of choice attributes, weighted by their momentary 
goal relevance. Some of these attributes are associated with hedonism (e.g., self-regarding 
concerns in altruistic choice) and some are associated with social norms and standards for 
behavior (e.g. other-regarding concerns). For expository purposes, we refer to these respectively 
as hedonic and normative attributes. Intuitively, whether our computational algorithm makes a 
hedonistic or normative choice depends not only on the magnitude of hedonic and normative 
attributes, but also on their weight: higher weights on normative attributes lead to more norm-
consistent responses.  
 
What role does the dlPFC play in the anDDM? The observation of increased posterior dlPFC 
response when people choose consistently with normatively favored goals (e.g., healthy over 
unhealthy choices) has been taken to suggest that this region acts either to modulate the 
processing of attribute values or their weights in favor of normatively-favored goals1,6, or to 
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inhibit hedonistic reward-related responding19,20. In contrast, we propose that activity in this 
region reflects processes related to the response selection stage of decisions. This suggests that 
dlPFC response during normative choice represents a downstream consequence of valuation 
processes, rather than a direct causal influence on them. To support this argument, we use the 
anDDM to simulate when and why we might observe greater activity in the dlPFC (and regions 
with similar response profiles) when resolving a choice. As we describe below, these simulations 
suggest that normative choices should be associated with greater neural activation in the dlPFC 
only when two things are true: hedonic attribute values directly oppose normative attribute 
values, and hedonic attributes receive more weight as inputs to the anDDM. In contrast, when 
normative attributes receive more weight, hedonistic choices should produce greater activity in 
the dlPFC and other areas associated with response selection.  
 
We then used these observations to make two predictions. First, if people by default favor 
hedonic over normative attributes, then most studies will observe greater dlPFC response when 
people choose the normatively-favored option. This prediction does not strongly distinguish our 
account from alternatives. However, our model makes a second, more novel prediction: if a 
normally hedonistic decision maker focuses on normative goals, this should reduce activation in 
the dlPFC when choosing the normatively-favored option. A straightforward reading of an 
attribute-weighting account predicts the opposite: a normally hedonistic individual who 
deliberately attempts to focus on normative responding should show increased activation in the 
dlPFC in order to alter attribute weighting in favor of normative goals19,21. We test these two 
alternative predictions across three studies and two canonical self-control contexts in which 
people frequently struggle to align their actual behaviors with normative goals: altruistic and 
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dietary choice. In all cases, results strongly supported the predictions of the anDDM. These 
findings raise new and important questions regarding the role of the dlPFC– and effortful self-
control more generally – in promoting normative choice.  
 
Results 
Simulating the dilemma of self-control 
Although self-control dilemmas can take a variety of forms, for expository purposes we 
here take a single, typical self-control dilemma: a decision maker deciding whether to indulge in 
a decadent snack or opt for something healthier. This example allows us to capture two critical 
features: first, self-control dilemmas typically involve making decisions about options that vary 
in the magnitude or value of hedonic and normative attributes (e.g. tastiness and healthiness). 
Second, the decision-maker must weigh these attributes based on goals that can vary in their 
relative strength at different times. At a nice restaurant, tastiness may be prioritized. When trying 
to lose weight, healthiness is prioritized. We used simulations to explicitly capture these two 
features. 
 
Simulations were realized using a neural network instantiation of our anDDM18 where choices 
result from dynamic interactions between two separate but intermingled pools of neurons 
representing the different options under consideration (Figure 1). Activation in each pool 
accumulates noisily based on a combination of external inputs from hedonic and normative 
attributes weighted by their current subjective importance, inhibitory inputs from the other pool, 
and recurrent self-stimulation (see Methods for details). This model generated predictions for 
how magnitudes and weights for hedonic and normative attributes influence the likelihood of a 
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virtuous (i.e., healthy) choice, response time [RT], and neural response. These simulations 
yielded three key observations about behavior and neural response, which we describe in the 
context of food choice but apply in theory across any self-control dilemma that requires 
weighing hedonic rewards against normative values and goals. 
 
 
Figure 1. Attribute-based neural drift diffusion model (anDDM) of normative choice. Each 
option’s hedonic and normative attributes (e.g., tastiness = +5 and healthiness = 0 for the sundae) 
are weighted by their current importance (e.g., wTaste [wT] and wHealth [wH]) and summed to 
construct relative option values [VO1 – VO2]. These values, corrupted by momentary noise at time 
t [ε1(t)], serve as the external inputs to two mutually inhibitory neuronal pools representing the 
two options. Neural activation in these two pools (red and green lines in upper right plot) 
accumulates over time until one hits a predefined threshold, determining both the simulated 
response time (RT) and the simulated choice. Choices are classified as normative if the option 
with higher normative attribute value (in this case, higher healthiness, i.e. the apple in option 2) 
is selected. The sum of neural activation across the two pools can be used to simulate expected 
neural signals at the time of choice, and can be convolved with the canonical hemodynamic 
response function to construct a predicted BOLD signal for each choice (lower right inset). 
 
 
Observation 1: The likelihood of a normative choice depends on the value of hedonic and 
normative attributes. To capture the idea that some choices (e.g. ice cream vs. Brussels sprouts) 
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represent more of a self-control conflict than others (e.g. strawberries vs. lard), we simulated a 
single decision maker facing choices between hypothetical options that independently varied the 
relative value of normative and hedonic attributes (e.g. the foods’ relative healthiness and 
tastiness). In the context of food choice, we classified a simulated choice as normative (healthy) 
when the simulation selected the option with higher healthiness. Choices were classified as 
hedonistic (unhealthy) otherwise. To determine the effect of current behavioral goals, we 
simulated the decision maker’s choices for a variety of different weights on healthiness (wHealth) 
and tastiness (wTaste). 
 
Figure 2a illustrates how variation in tastiness and healthiness of an option relative to the 
alternative affects a decision maker’s general propensity to make a healthy choice (i.e., 
averaging over different instances of wTaste and wHealth). As can be seen, the magnitude and sign 
of the two attributes matters: she tends to choose more healthily when one option dominates on 
both healthiness and tastiness (no-conflict trials). She chooses less healthily when one option is 
tastier while the other is healthier (conflict trials). She is least likely to choose normatively when 
the difference in tastiness is large and the difference in healthiness is small. Thus, our 
simulations make the commonsense prediction that attribute values matter in determining the 
overall likelihood that an individual makes a healthy/normative choice. 
 
Observation 2: The likelihood of a normative choice depends on weights given to normative and 
hedonic attributes. We next attempted to capture the idea that an individual might vary from 
context to context in the goals that they prioritize, and that the essence of self-control is to 
prioritize (i.e., assign a higher weight to) normative attributes like healthiness, or to deprioritize 
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(i.e., assign a lower weight to) hedonic attributes like tastiness. We thus simulated the decision 
maker in different goal states by assuming different weights on hedonic and normative attributes 
(i.e. tastiness and healthiness). We show two example simulations in Figure 2b-d. Unsurprisingly, 
the decision maker chooses healthily less frequently when weight on tastiness is higher than 
weight on healthiness. However, these differences are starkest in conflict trials, and essentially 
vanish for no-conflict trials (Figure 1d). 
 
 
Figure 2. Simulating the dilemma of self-control. Top: The computational model can be used to 
simulate decision making for any self-control context requiring an integration of normative and 
hedonistic considerations (healthy eating displayed). (a) On average across multiple different 
goals, the likelihood of a healthy choice depends on the relative attribute values of one option vs. 
another, and is less likely when tastiness and healthiness conflict. Warmer colors indicate a 
higher likelihood of choosing the healthier option. Specific goals (b) prioritizing tastiness or (c) 
prioritizing healthiness alter the overall frequency of healthy choice, although in both contexts 
unhealthy choices are more likely for large differences in tastiness and small differences in 
healthiness. (d) The overall likelihood of a healthy choice (averaged for all combinations of 
conflict or no conflict choices). Goals prioritizing tastiness (black bars) produce fewer healthy 
choices than goals prioritizing healthiness (gray bars), but only when tastiness and healthiness 
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conflict. Bottom: e-g) The computational model can also simulate expected neural activity (i.e. 
aggregate activity in the two neuronal pools, summed over decision time: 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1+!"#$
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2) when choosing healthy [H] or unhealthy [UH] options, as a function of relative option 
values and different goals. Warmer colors indicate more activity when a healthy choice was 
made (i.e., Activity H > Activity UH). h) Overall difference in neural activity for H compared to 
UH choices for goals prioritizing tastiness (black bars) and healthiness (gray bars), divided as a 
function of attribute conflict. In no conflict trials, healthy choices elicit less activity regardless of 
goal (i.e. Activity H < Activity UH). In conflict trials, however, healthy choices elicit more activity 
(i.e. Activity H > Activity UH), but only when goals prioritize tastiness. Identical results are 
obtained when substituting RT for neural response (see Supplementary Figure 1). 
 
 
Observation 3. Normative choices result in higher neural response only if attributes conflict and 
the decision maker weights hedonic attributes more. The last and most important goal of our 
computational model simulations was to examine how neural response in cognitive control 
regions like the dLPFC (assuming a correlation with the anDDM) might depend on weights 
given to hedonic and normative attributes (Figure 2e-h). We characterized this simulated 
response as aggregate activity of the two neuronal pools, summed over the duration of the choice, 
as this is what would contribute to observable BOLD responses.  
 
Comparing differences in simulated neural response for healthy and unhealthy choices yields two 
important conclusions. First, when options do not conflict on healthiness or tastiness (i.e. one 
option is better on both), healthy choices generally elicit less activity than unhealthy ones (Figure 
2e). Notably, for no-conflict trials this holds true irrespective of whether a decision maker is 
currently prioritizing tastiness or healthiness (Figure 2f-g). Second, and more importantly, when 
attributes conflict, network activity during healthy vs. unhealthy choices shows a striking 
dependence on an individual’s goals (i.e. the relative balance of wHealth and wTaste). In conflict 
trials, hedonism-favoring goals (i.e., wTaste > wHealth) result in higher activity on average when 
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choosing healthily (Figure 2h). This difference becomes exaggerated as the magnitudes of 
tastiness and healthiness increase (Figure 2f). In contrast, when goals prioritize normative 
attributes like healthiness (i.e., wHealth > wTaste), simulated neural responses are lower on average 
for healthy compared to unhealthy choices (Figure 2g,h). Thus, neural response is positively 
associated with normative choice (i.e., greater neural activity to choose normatively instead of 
hedonistically) only when the decision maker places a higher weight on hedonistic than 
normative attributes. The same is true of simulated RTs, which are often used as a proxy for both 
choice difficulty and the presence of control (Supplementary Figure 1). Thus, in the anDDM the 
observation that normative choices activate brain areas associated with cognitive control might 
simply indicate that hedonic attributes are currently weighted more highly.  
 
Testing computational predictions using fMRI data 
The anDDM accurately predicts dlPFC activity across a variety of contexts.  
It is currently unknown whether activity in the dlPFC region frequently associated with self-
control might reflect activation patterns in the anDDM in the same manner as simple choice18. 
We thus began by verifying that trial-by-trial simulated neural activity in the anDDM correlated 
with activity in this region for complex, multi-attribute choices typical of different real-world 
self-control dilemmas. Note that, while this correlation could occur because the dlPFC performs 
the precise computations carried out by the anDDM, such a correlation could also occur if the 
dlPFC performs separate computational functions that activate proportionally to anDDM activity. 
In either case, we would expect trial-by-trial activity of the dlPFC to correlate with predictions of 
the anDDM. 
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Our analysis focused on three previously-collected fMRI datasets22,23 (see Methods for details). 
Study 1 (N = 51) and Study 2 (N = 49) utilized an Altruistic Choice Task trading off different 
monetary outcomes for self and an anonymous partner in a modified version of a Dictator game 
(Figure 3a, b, see Methods for details). Study 3, completed on a subset of participants from Study 
2 (N = 36), utilized a Food Choice Task (Figure 3c) with different foods varying in tastiness and 
healthiness. In Study 1, choices were made with the instruction to simply choose the most-
preferred option. In Studies 2 and 3, participants made choices in one of three conditions that 
manipulated goals/attribute weights by instructing participants to focus on different normative or 
hedonistic attributes (a point we return to below). Studies 1 and 2 involved only trials involving 
conflict between hedonic and normative attributes. Study 3 included trials both with and without 
such conflict. 
 
 
  
Figure 3. FMRI task designs. (a) In Study 1, participants made choices involving tradeoffs 
between monetary payoff for another person ($Other; normative attribute) and for themselves 
($Self; hedonic attribute) in an Altruistic Choice Task. (b) In Study 2, participants made choices 
similar to the Altruistic Choice Task in Study 1, while we manipulated the weights on normative 
and hedonic attributes using instructions presented at the beginning of each task block. These 
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instructions asked participants to focus on different pro-social motivations (ethical considerations, 
partner’s feelings) as they made their choice. (c) In Study 3, we examined the generalizability of 
the model-based predictions in another choice domain. Here, we manipulated weights on food’s 
healthiness (normative attribute) and tastiness (hedonic attribute) using a Food Choice Task. In 
all studies, participants had 4 seconds to decide, and gave their response on a 4-point scale from 
“Strong No” to “Strong Yes”. 
 
We predicted that dlPFC activity should correlate parametrically with simulated activity of the 
anDDM during self-control dilemmas. To test this notion we first fit computational parameters of 
the anDDM to each participant’s behavior (see Supplemental Figure 2 for model fits). We then 
asked whether parametric variation in the measured BOLD signals within the dlPFC ROI 
correlated with simulated response across all three fMRI studies (see Methods for detail).  
 
As predicted, a three-way conjunction analysis identified the left dlPFC at our a priori threshold 
(Figure 4a, center-of-mass x = -56, y = 19, z = 21, P = .005 in Study 1, P = .02 in Study 2, and P 
< .001 in Study 3, all Ps small-volume corrected for multiple comparisons). Intriguingly, 
although they are not the focus of this study, we also observed a whole-brain corrected 
conjunction of activation across all three studies in two other regions often associated with 
conflict and cognitive control: the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and anterior 
insula/inferior frontal gyrus (Ps < .001, whole-brain corrected across all three studies, 
Supplemental Figures S3 and S4). No other regions showed a similarly consistent, three-way 
conjunction across all three studies. 
 
Recruitment of the dlPFC when choosing normatively only occurs when goals are hedonistic and 
attributes conflict (Observation #3).  
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The preceding analysis confirmed that activity in the left dlPFC covaries with predicted activity 
simulated in the anDDM in three independent fMRI studies. We next confirmed the central 
prediction of our simulations concerning the relationship between normative choices and activity 
in the dlPFC. In particular, models suggesting that the dlPFC promotes normative choices1,6,20 
imply that norm-consistent choices should be accompanied by greater activation in the dlPFC (as 
has been observed previously). Moreover, this should be especially true when people focus on 
normative goals6,7, since those goals support norm-sensitive behavior and might require the 
override of default hedonistic preferences19,24. The anDDM makes the opposite prediction. While 
neural activity in the model (and by extension the dlPFC) can be higher for normative compared 
to hedonistic choices, this should be true only when goals lead to stronger weighting of hedonic 
attributes and attribute values conflict (c.f. Figure 2h). Thus, if a regulatory focus on normative 
attributes increases their weight in the evidence accumulation process, this should increase 
normative choices, but result in lower, not higher, neural activity for those choices. We tested 
these predictions by performing a region-of-interest (ROI) analysis in the dlPFC region identified 
by the three-way conjunction above, examining the contrast of activity for normative compared 
to hedonistic choices in different contexts. In Study 1 (altruistic choice) this involved choices 
made only during natural, unregulated decision making. In Study 2 (altruistic choice) and Study 
3 (food choice) we examined choices made under different regulatory goals that were designed 
to increase or decrease weights on hedonic and normative attributes (i.e. self and other in 
altruistic choice, tastiness and healthiness in food choice). 
 
Generous vs. selfish choices (Study 1). In Study 1, choices were defined as normative (i.e., 
generous) if the participant selected the option with less money for themselves and more money 
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for their partner. Choices were defined as hedonistic (i.e., selfish) otherwise. Weights from the 
best-fitting model parameters indicated that subjects naturally placed more weight on their own 
outcomes (mean wSelf = .0036±.0011s.d.) than the other person’s outcomes (mean wOther 
= .0008±.0015, paired-t50 = 12.37, P = 2.2×10-16) or on fairness (i.e., |Self – Other|, mean wFairness 
= .0008±.001, paired-t50 = 8.30, P = 7.82×10-11). Given the higher weight on self-interest, a 
hedonic attribute, and the fact that all trials in this study involved conflict between normative and 
hedonic attributes, we predicted that we should observe greater neural response when people 
chose generously. An ROI analysis of BOLD response in the dlPFC for generous vs. selfish 
choices strongly supported this prediction (Figure 4d, paired-t43 = 2.98, P = .005). A whole-brain 
analysis confirmed that this pattern was specific to the dlPFC, as well as the dACC and 
insula/IFG regions also associated with the anDDM, rather than a general property of neural 
activity (see Supplementary Table 3 for details). 
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Figure 4. BOLD responses in the left dlPFC during self-control dilemmas. Top: Trial-by-trial 
BOLD response in the dlPFC correlates with predicted activity of the anDDM across three 
separate studies, including during both altruistic choice (a, b) and during dietary choice (c). All 
maps thresholded at P < .001 uncorrected for display purposes. Bottom: Within the dlPFC ROI 
defined by the three-way conjunction of anDDM response across all studies, BOLD response 
during normative choice (black) vs. hedonistic choice (light gray) when attributes conflict, in d) 
Study 1 for all trials, as well as in e) Study 2 and f) Study 3 as a function of regulatory goals. As 
predicted, normative choices activate the dlPFC, but only when goals result in a greater weight 
on hedonistic than normative attributes. * P < .05; ** P < .01. 
 
 
 
Regulatory effects on generous vs. selfish responding (Study 2). In Study 2 (also anonymous 
altruistic decision making and conflict trials only), we sought to replicate and extend these 
results. More specifically, we sought to test the anDDM prediction that if regulatory goals 
increase the weight on normative attributes, this should result in decreased activation in the 
dlPFC when choosing normatively. To manipulate weights on hedonic and normative attributes, 
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we used an instructed cognitive regulation manipulation in which we asked participants on 
different trials either to “Respond Naturally” (mirroring the natural preferences expressed by 
participants in Study 1) or to focus on one of two different goals (“Focus on Ethics” [Ethics], 
“Focus on your Partner’s Feelings” [Partner]) that both emphasize normative attributes, but in 
different ways (see Methods for details). To confirm that the manipulation influenced attribute 
weights, we performed one-way repeated-measures ANOVAs with condition (Natural, Ethics, 
Partner) as a fixed effect and best-fitting attribute weight parameters wSelf, wOther, and wFairness as 
dependent variables. This analysis confirmed that our manipulation yielded significantly 
different weights on the attributes across the conditions (all F2,96 > 13.54, all P < 6.59×10-6, see 
Methods for details of model fitting). As expected, weights for self-interest (a hedonic attribute, 
wSelf) were highest in the Natural condition (MNatural = .0073±.0035 s.d.), lower in the Ethics 
condition (MEthics = .0061±.0047), and lowest in the Partner condition (MPartner = .0037±.0065). 
By contrast, weights on the partner’s outcomes and fairness (attributes related more strongly to 
social norms) increased with regulation (wOther: MNatural = .0010±.0038, MEthics = .0041±.0045, 
MPartner = .0051±.0038; wFairness: MNatural = .0017±.0033, MEthics = .0053±.0046, MPartner 
= .0024±.0035). 
 
Having confirmed that the regulatory focus manipulation altered weights on hedonic and 
normative attributes, we next asked if this manipulation affected BOLD response during 
generous vs. selfish choice in the dlPFC, consistent with predictions of the anDDM. In particular, 
given that all trials involved conflict between normative and hedonic attributes, we predicted that 
in the Natural condition, where participants generally placed higher weight on self-interest (a 
hedonic attribute), generous choices should elicit higher activation. In contrast, in the Partner 
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condition, which elicited higher weight on normative attributes (i.e., other’s outcomes and 
fairness), selfish choices should elicit the greatest activity in the dlPFC. The Ethics condition, 
which elicited similar weights across the attributes, should lie in between.  
 
To test these predictions, we performed one-way repeated measures ANOVAs with condition 
(Natural, Ethics, Partner) as a fixed effect and average BOLD response in the dlPFC ROI for the 
contrast of generous vs. selfish choice as the dependent variable. This analysis revealed a 
significant effect of condition on dlPFC response (F2,96 = 4.67, P = .01). Post-hoc planned 
comparisons confirmed that in the Natural condition, generous choices elicited significantly 
greater activity in the dlPFC (P = .04, Figure 4e), replicating the observed difference during 
Natural choices of Study 1. By contrast, in the Ethics and Partner focus conditions, generous 
choices no longer elicited significantly greater activation. Instead, selfish choices elicited greater 
activation, although the effect did not reach statistical significance. Thus, in the same individuals, 
the association between generous choices and higher activation in the dlPFC depended on 
whether goals emphasized selfishness rather than social norms (Figure 4e). Supplemental whole-
brain analyses confirmed these findings (see Supplementary Results, and Supplementary Table 3 
for details). 
 
Regulatory effects on healthy vs. unhealthy choice (Study 3). In Study 3, we sought to replicate 
the finding that a regulatory focus on normative attributes reduces activation in the dlPFC, but in 
a new, non-social domain: healthy eating. During the Food Choice Task in Study 3, we 
manipulated attribute weights by instructing participants either to “Respond Naturally”, “Focus 
on Health”, or “Focus on Taste” while making their choice. Normative (i.e., healthy) choices 
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were defined as selecting the food with higher subjectively perceived healthiness (see Methods 
for details). Note that the “Focus on Health” instruction aimed to increase weight on healthiness 
(wHealth), a normative attribute. Extending results of Study 2, the “Focus on Taste” condition was 
designed to enhance the weight on tastiness (wTaste), the hedonic attribute, which should preserve 
or even enhance the difficulty of normative choices that we observed in natural choice settings in 
study 1 and 2. This allowed us to verify that our findings are specifically driven by changes in 
weights, not simply because we asked participants to perform a cognitive task. 
 
To confirm that the regulatory manipulation influenced attribute weights, we performed one-way 
repeated-measures ANOVAs, similar to Study 2, with condition (Natural, Taste, Health) as a 
fixed effect and estimated attribute weight parameters wTaste and wHealth as dependent variables. 
This analysis confirmed that our manipulation yielded significantly different weights on the 
different attributes across the conditions (all Fs > 104.2, all P < 2.2×10-6). As expected, weights 
on tastiness (a hedonic attribute) were highest in the Taste condition (MTaste = 0.0077±.0029), 
similar but slightly lower in the Natural condition (MNatural = 0.0074±.0027) and lowest in the 
Health condition (MHealth = 0.002±0.0028). Weights on healthiness (a normative attribute) 
showed the opposite pattern, being lowest in the Taste condition (MTaste = -0.0008±0.0018), 
similar though slightly higher in the Natural condition (MNatural = -0.0002±0.0018) and highest in 
the Health condition (MHealth = 0.0055±0.0034). 
 
Given these weights, we predicted that on the subset of trials involving conflict between 
healthiness and tastiness, healthy compared to unhealthy choices should elicit the greatest 
activation in the dlPFC in the Taste condition. In contrast, unhealthy choices should elicit greater 
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activation in the Health condition. The Natural condition should lie in between these two 
extremes, being more similar to the Taste condition. To test these predictions, we performed a 
one-way repeated measures ANOVA, similar to Study 2, with condition (Natural, Taste, Health) 
as a fixed effect and the average dlPFC BOLD response in the contrast of healthy vs. unhealthy 
choice (limited to trials with attribute conflict) as the dependent variable. As hypothesized, this 
analysis revealed a significant effect of condition on response (F = 4.269, P = .018). Follow-up t-
tests confirmed the predicted direction of activation (Figure 4f). BOLD response during healthy 
compared to unhealthy choices was significantly greater in the Taste condition for the dlPFC 
(paired-t32 = 2.67, p = .01). In the Health condition by contrast, activity was significantly greater 
for unhealthy choices in the left dlPFC (paired-t34 = 2.061, p = .05). Response for healthy vs. 
unhealthy choice in the Natural condition lay in between these two extremes. Thus, in the same 
individuals, healthy choices could be accompanied by higher activation in brain regions typically 
associated with cognitive control (when goals emphasized hedonism), or lower activation (when 
goals emphasized health norms). Supplemental whole-brain analyses confirmed that this pattern 
of results was specific to the dlPFC and other regions associated with the anDDM (see 
Supplementary Results, and Supplementary Table 3 for details). 
 
Regulatory effects in the absence of conflict (Study 3).  
Our analyses so far focused on conflict trials, since simulations suggest that these trials show the 
biggest differences as a function of attribute weights (Figure 2). The design of Study 3, which 
included a subset of trials with no attribute conflict, also allowed us to test one further prediction 
of the anDDM. In Observation #3, we found that normative choices should only be associated 
with increased neural activity when hedonic and normative attributes conflict (Figure 2h). When 
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attributes do not conflict, the anDDM predicts that normative choices should on average result in 
lower neural response. Moreover, the anDDM suggests smaller differences in response across 
goal contexts favoring hedonism or health norms. This suggests that, in contrast to conflicted 
choices, there should be less effect of regulatory focus on dlPFC response during no-conflict 
choices.  
 
To test this prediction, we first performed a one-way repeated measures ANOVA with condition 
(Natural, Taste, Health) as a fixed effect and the average BOLD in the dlPFC for the contrast of 
healthy vs. unhealthy choice as the dependent variable, focusing only on the subset of trials with 
no conflict between tastiness and healthiness of a food (i.e., when the value of the option was 
positive or negative for both). As predicted, there was no significant influence of regulatory 
condition on the difference in neural activity between healthy and unhealthy choice (F2,68 = 0.477, 
P = .62). Given this lack of effect across conditions, we averaged the three conditions together to 
analyze the main effect of healthy vs. unhealthy choice. This analysis indicated that healthy 
choices were accompanied by non-significantly lower response in this region (paired-t35 = 1.51, 
p = .07, one-tailed). Results in other regions correlating with the anDDM, including the dACC 
and insula/IFG showed an even stronger pattern (see Supplemental Results for more details). In 
other words, as expected from model simulations, activation in the dlPFC for normative choices 
when normative and hedonic attributes did not conflict is generally low, and shows little to no 
effect of regulatory focus or the relative weight on tastiness and healthiness. 
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Discussion 
When and why do normative choices (i.e., those choices that conform to abstract standards and 
social rules) recruit regions associated with cognitive control like the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (dlPFC)? Simulated activity from an attribute-based neural drift diffusion model 
(anDDM) suggests a straightforward answer: normative behavior may only trigger the dlPFC 
when normative attributes conflict with hedonic ones, and the decision maker values hedonic 
attributes more. Across three separate fMRI studies and two different choice domains (generosity 
and healthy eating), we show several results that confirm predictions of the anDDM. First, we 
show that activation in the dlPFC correlates consistently with predicted activity of the anDDM 
across all contexts examined. Second, we show that even in individuals who show a natural bias 
towards selfishness, regulatory instructions to focus on socially normative attributes increase 
generosity but reduce dlPFC response when choosing generously. Third, this pattern replicated 
in the domain of healthy eating, suggesting a general principle that may apply across a variety of 
self-control dilemmas. Our results provide empirical support for recent theories positing that 
successful self-control—defined as choosing long-term or abstract benefits over hedonic, 
immediate gratification25—depends importantly on value computations. They stand in contrast to 
the predictions of models of posterior dlPFC function suggesting that the strength with which the 
dlPFC activates during choice determines whether prepotent hedonistic responses are 
resisted19,21,24,26. Our results point to a modified conceptualization of the role played by the 
dlPFC in promoting normative choice. 
 
A large literature, generally consistent with models that assume normative behavior requires 
controlled processing, suggests that the dlPFC activates when prepotent responses conflict with 
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desired normative outcomes27,28. The neural activity of the anDDM, which arises from mutually 
inhibitory pools of option neurons receiving weighted inputs from hedonic and virtuous 
attributes, is in some ways consistent with such an interpretation. However, it calls into question 
assumptions that prepotency equates to hedonism, or even to automaticity29 more generally. 
Instead, our model suggests that the “prepotent response” may correspond, at least in the realm 
of value-based decision making, to choices consistent with the choice attribute that is currently 
receiving higher weight, regardless of the source of that weight. In other words, even when 
higher weights on normative attributes derive primarily from a deliberative, regulatory focus, as 
in our final two studies23, this results in reduced activity in the dlPFC when making normative 
choices (and greater activity when choosing hedonistically). Mechanistically, these patterns 
result from the fact that higher weights on normative attributes reduce the computation required 
for competitive neural interactions to settle on the normative response. Thus, while virtuous 
choices associated with successful self-control may sometimes recruit the posterior dlPFC, 
manipulations that increase the weight on normative attributes, either by making it more salient 
in the exogenous environment or focusing endogenous attention towards it, should both promote 
normative behavior and make it easier to accomplish. 
 
This observation may help to explain why some researchers have found evidence consistent with 
greater response in the dlPFC promoting normative choice1,3,6,9,30,31, while others have not10-12. 
Variations that influence the weight on normative attributes—whether across individuals, goal 
contexts, or paradigms—will tend to reduce statistical significance and increase heterogeneity in 
the link between neural activation in the dlPFC and normative choice. Fortunately, our model 
provides a way to predict both when and why dlPFC activity will be observed. For example, in 
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the domain of intertemporal choice, our model predicts that making future outcomes more salient 
should amplify their weight in the choice process, promoting patience while decreasing dlPFC 
activation. This is exactly what is observed empirically12. Thus, researchers would do well to 
interpret activation of the dlPFC for a particular kind of choice (be it generous or selfish, healthy 
or unhealthy, patient or impatient) with caution. Such a pattern may say less about whether the 
dlPFC (and by extension, cognitive control more generally) is required to inhibit instinctual 
responses and preferences, and more about what kinds of attributes are most salient or valuable 
in the moment. 
 
Our results have important implications for theories of self-control suggesting that the dlPFC 
promotes self-control by modulating attribute weights in the choice process1,31,32. The region of 
dlPFC that we observe here correlating with the anDDM is nearly identical to areas observed 
when dieters made healthy compared to unhealthy choices1, and when participants are required 
to recompute values based on contextual information32. Yet we find that the relationship between 
self-control “success” and “failure” in this region reverses when participants actively focus on 
health: dlPFC now responds more strongly to unhealthy choices. These results seem incongruent 
with the notion that this area down-regulates weight on norm-inconsistent considerations and up-
regulates norm-consistent ones, since we observed decreased responses in this area in the context 
of increased normative choice and increased weight on normative attributes (Figure 4, c.f. 23). 
Instead, this region appeared to correlate with the evidence accumulation stage of decisions, 
rather than with the evidence construction stage, responding during decision conflict generally, 
regardless of whether that conflict derived from greater weighting of hedonic or normative 
attributes.  
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We emphasize, however, that our results and conclusions apply narrowly to the area of dlPFC 
identified. The anDDM-related dlPFC region in this study lies posterior and dorsal to another 
dlPFC area that we have observed, in these same datasets, to track hedonistic and normative 
attributes in a goal-consistent manner and to serve as a candidate for mediating regulation-
induced changes23. Furthermore, gray matter volume in this more anterior dlPFC area, but not in 
the posterior dlPFC region identified here, correlates with regulatory success33. Thus, while some 
areas of the dlPFC may indeed play an important role in promoting self-regulation and virtue by 
altering attribute weights in decision value, we suspect that they are anatomically and 
computationally distinct from the region of the posterior dlPFC sometimes assumed to serve this 
role. Future work will be needed to better delineate subregions of the dlPFC, and to determine 
the unique role each one plays in promoting normative choices. 
 
The close correspondence between predictions of the anDDM and activation patterns in the 
dlPFC makes it tempting to conclude that this region performs this computational function. 
While this hypothesis is consistent with results from single-cell recordings17,34, we also 
acknowledge that the dlPFC has been associated with many computational functions and roles, 
not all of which are mutually incompatible. Thus, it is possible that the dlPFC region observed 
here performs some sort of process that is correlated with, but not identical to, the neuronal 
computations of the anDDM. Future work, including computational modifications or additions to 
the anDDM, as well as recordings from other modalities34, may help not only to elucidate the 
precise computational functions served by this area, but also the ways in which it promotes 
adaptive choice and virtuous behavior. Work extending these findings to other domains of 
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virtuous choice, such as moral decision making or intertemporal choice, may also help to identify 
the commonalities and differences across different self-control dilemmas. 
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Methods 
Computational Model Simulations 
Our attribute-based neural drift diffusion model (anDDM: Figure 1) assumes that brain areas 
involved in decision making (particularly those that convert preferences into action) contain two 
spatially intermingled populations of neurons representing the options under consideration (here 
denoted as Option 1 and Option 2), with instantaneous firing rates (FR) at time t of FR1(t) and 
FR2(t). At the beginning of the choice period FR1(0) = FR2(0) = 0. Firing rates in each population 
evolve dynamically from the onset of choice based on the sum total of excitatory and inhibitory 
inputs (detailed below). A choice results at time t’, the first moment at which the firing rate of 
one of the two populations exceeds a predetermined threshold or barrier B. The total response 
time RT is t’ plus a constant non-decision time (ndt) that accounts for perceptual and motor 
delays. 
 
Firing rates in the two pools evolve noisily over time according to the following two equations: 
𝐹𝑅! 𝑡 = max 0,  𝛾×𝐹𝑅! 𝑡 − 1 − 𝜁×𝐹𝑅! 𝑡 − 1 + 𝑣! − 𝑣! + 𝜀! 𝑡
𝐹𝑅! 𝑡 = max 0,  𝛾×𝐹𝑅! 𝑡 − 1 − 𝜁×𝐹𝑅! 𝑡 − 1 + 𝑣! − 𝑣! + 𝜀! 𝑡
 
where the noise terms 𝜀!(𝑡) are normally distributed ~N(0,.1), 𝛾 ≥ 1 represents recurrent auto-
stimulation from the pool onto itself, 𝜁 ≥ 0 represents inhibitory input from the other pool, and 𝑣! 
and 𝑣! represent external inputs proportional to the overall values of Options 1 and 2, determined 
by the weighted sum of their choice-relevant attribute values: 
𝑣! = 𝑤!𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏!!
!
𝑣! = 𝑤!𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏!!
!
. 
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Thus, each pool’s activity receives an external input proportional to its value relative to the other 
option. In our simulations, we assumed two independent attributes: one related to hedonism (e.g., 
tastiness of a food) and one related to norms and standards (e.g. healthiness), although in 
principle any number and type of attribute could occur. Using these equations allowed us to 
simulate the dynamically evolving balance of excitation and inhibition across the two neuronal 
populations, and to derive distributions of both response times (RTs) and neural response. We 
label the final output (i.e., choice) of the system as “normative” if it results in selecting the 
option with the higher unweighted value for the normative attribute (e.g., the option with higher 
healthiness). 
 
To simulate everyday self-control dilemmas using this framework, we simulated choices 
between two options representing different combinations of hedonistic and normative attributes, 
allowing the relative value difference between an option and its alternative on a given attribute to 
vary independently in the arbitrarily chosen range [-3, -2, … +2, +3]. This permitted us to 
explore how the likelihood of a normative choice changes depending on how much better or 
worse one of the two options is along hedonic and normative attribute dimensions, as well as 
what happens when the relative values of the two attributes conflict (i.e. take opposite signs) or 
do not.  
 
We also sought to capture in our simulations the notion that a decision maker can vary from 
moment to moment in their commitment to and desire for hedonistic vs. normative goals. For 
example, a dieter may begin to relax the importance they place on norm-consistent attributes like 
healthiness once they reach their target weight, resulting in more unhealthy choices. In the main 
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text (and Figure 2), we focus on simulations for two different goal contexts: one with a higher 
weight on tastiness, a hedonic attribute (i.e., wT = .05, wH = .02) and one with a higher weight on 
healthiness, a normative attribute (wT = .02, wH = .05). For simplicity, we assumed that all choices 
used a choice-determining threshold B=0.15, selected to produce RTs in the range typically 
observed in human subjects. Thus, for purposes of illustration, we simulated a decision-maker in 
two different contexts with different weights on the two attributes, facing 49 distinct choices 
representing different combinations of attribute values. To ensure that our conclusions held 
across a variety of weights, we also simulated an additional 34 different goal contexts, fully 
covering the factorial combination of weights on wT and wH in the range of 0, .01, .02 … .05. 
Using these values and weights, we simulated choice frequencies, total neural activation 
(summed across the two neuronal pools), and RTs for each of the different hypothetical option 
pairs/attribute combinations, probing the effects of attribute weights, attribute magnitudes, and 
attribute conflict (i.e. match or mismatch between the signs of nornative and hedonic attribute). 
Results of these simulations are displayed in Figure 2. Code is available at [link released after 
publication]. 
 
Experimental Studies 
Details about portions of Studies 1, 2 and 3, as well as neuroimaging parameters, have been 
reported previously22,23. Here, we highlight in brief the most important details for the current 
work. 
 
Participants. For Study 1, we analyzed data from 51 male volunteers (mean age 22, range 18-35). 
All participants received a show-up fee of $30 as well as an additional amount ranging from $0-
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$100, depending on the outcome of the task (see below). For Study 2, we analyzed data from 49 
volunteers (26 male, mean age 28, range 19-40). For Study 3, 36 individuals from Study 2 
returned to the lab for a separate session on a separate day to complete a dietary choice task. For 
each session in Studies 2 and 3, participants received a show-up fee of $50. Participants 
completing the altruistic choice task in Study 2 also received from $0-$40 in additional earnings, 
depending on the outcome of the task (see below). Caltech’s Internal Review Board approved all 
procedures. Participants in all studies provided informed consent prior to participation.  
 
Tasks and Stimuli 
Altruistic Choice Task (Studies 1 & 2). We examined self-control dilemmas pitting self-interest 
against generosity using an Altruistic Choice Task for Studies 1 and 2. On every trial in the 
scanner, the participant chose between a proposed pair of monetary prizes to herself and a real 
but anonymous partner, or a constant default prize-pair to both ($50 in Study 1, $20 in Study 2) 
(Figure 3a-b). Proposed prizes in the prize-pair varied from $0 to $100 in Study 1 and $0 to $40 
in Study 2, and always involved one individual receiving an amount less than or equal to the 
default, while the other individual received more. Thus, on every trial the participant had to 
choose between generous behavior (benefitting the other at a cost to oneself) and selfish behavior 
(benefitting oneself at a cost to the other). 
 
Upon presentation of the proposal, participants had up to four seconds to indicate their choice 
using a 4-point scale (Strong No, No, Yes, Strong Yes), allowing us to simultaneously measure 
both their decision and strength of preference at the time of choice. The direction of increasing 
preference (right-to-left or left-to-right) varied for each round of the task in Study 1, and across 
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participants in Study 2. If the subject did not respond within four seconds, both individuals 
received $0 for that trial. 
 
To increase the anonymity of choices, the participant’s choice was implemented 
probabilistically: in 60% of trials he received his chosen option, while in 40% of trials his choice 
was reversed and he received the alternative, non-chosen option. This reversal meant that while it 
was always in the participant’s best interest to choose according to her true preferences, her 
partner could never be sure about the actual choice made. Probabilistic implementation does not 
strongly influence the choices participants make22,23, but permits more plausible anonymity, 
increasing the self-control challenge involved in choosing generously. The participants were 
informed that the passive partners were aware of the probabilistic implementation, and the 
outcome was revealed on every trial 2-4 seconds following the response.  
 
Study 1 included 180 trials total, with no specific instructions for how to respond. Study 2 
included 270 trials, 90 each in three instructed focus conditions. See the Manipulating Normative 
Goals (Studies 2 & 3) section below for details on these instructions.  
 
Dietary Choice Task (Study 3). We examined self-control dilemmas in a second context pitting 
hedonism against healthy eating using a Dietary Choice Task for Study 3. Prior to the task, 
participants rated a set of 200 different foods for their healthiness and tastiness. These ratings 
were used to 1) select a pool of 90 foods that covered a range of health and taste ratings and 2) 
select a neutral reference food rated as neutral on both health and taste.  
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On each of 270 trials in the scanner, participants saw one of the 90 different pre-selected foods 
(Figure 3c), and had to decide whether they would prefer to eat the displayed food or the 
reference food. As in the altruistic choice task, participants had up to four seconds to indicate 
their choice using a 4-point scale (Strong No, No, Yes, Strong Yes). If the subject did not 
respond within four seconds, one of the foods was selected randomly. To match the instructed 
attention manipulation used in the Altruistic Choice Task, participants completed 90 trials each 
in one of three instructed focus conditions. See the Manipulating Normative Goals (Studies 2 & 
3) section below for details. 
 
To match the probabilistic outcome used in the altruistic choice task, the participant’s choice was 
also implemented probabilistically in the Food Choice Task. In 60% of trials he received his 
chosen option, while in 40% of trials his choice was reversed and he received the alternative, 
non-chosen option. To reduce the length of the task, participants did not see this outcome on 
every trial. Instead, three trials were selected randomly at the end of each scan, and participants 
viewed their choice as well as the probabilistic outcome on that trial. 
 
Manipulating Normative Goals (Studies 2 & 3) 
Our computational model simulations suggested that the extent to which normative choices are 
associated with greater neural response depends to a large extent on the priority or weight given 
to normative vs. hedonic attributes. We thus capitalized on the design of Studies 2 and 3, which 
manipulated attention to different attributes (and corresponding weights), allowing us to test 
specific predictions of the anDDM. 
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Generosity Manipulation (Study 2). To manipulate attention to different attributes, during the 
Altruistic Choice Task in Study 2, participants completed trials in one of three different 
instructed focus conditions: Respond Naturally, Focus on Ethics, and Focus on Partner. During 
Natural trials, participants were told to allow whatever feelings and thoughts came most 
naturally to mind, and to just choose according to their preferences on that trial. During Ethics 
trials, participants were asked to focus on doing the right thing during their choices. They were 
encouraged to think about the justice of their choice, as well as its ethical or moral implications, 
and to try to bring their actions in line with these considerations. During Partner trials, 
participants were asked to focus on their partner’s feelings during their choices. They were 
encouraged to think about how the other person would be affected, as well as whether they 
would be happy with the choice, and to bring their actions in line with these considerations. 
 
Each participant completed 90 trials per condition, presented in randomly interleaved blocks of 
ten trials. A detailed set of instructions informing participants of their task for the upcoming 
block of trials was presented for 4 seconds prior to the block, and participants were asked to 
focus on the specific instruction for all trials within that block. 
 
Healthiness Manipulation (Study 3). Analogous to the Altruistic Choice Task in Study 2, we 
manipulated healthy eating in Study 3 using an instructed focus manipulation. Each participant 
completed 270 choice trials, 90 each in one of three attentional conditions: Natural Focus, Taste 
Focus, or Health Focus. During Natural trials, participants were told to allow whatever feelings 
and thoughts came most naturally to mind, and to just choose according to their preferences on 
that trial. During Taste trials, participants were asked to focus on how tasty each food was, and to 
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try to bring their actions in line with this consideration. During Health trials, participants were 
asked to focus on the health implications of their choice. As in the Altruistic Choice Task, 
attentional instructions were given prior to each block of 10 trials, and participants were asked to 
focus on the specific instruction given for all trials within a block. However, participants knew 
that they would receive the outcome of one of their choices, and were told that they should 
choose according to their preferences regardless of the instruction, thus encouraging participants 
to choose in a way that reflected their current decision value for the item.  
 
Defining Normative Choice 
Behavioral definition of generosity. All choices involved a tradeoff between maximizing 
outcomes for the self or for the other. We therefore label specific decisions as normative (i.e., 
generous) if the participant accepted a proposal when $Self < $Other, or rejected one when $Self 
> $Other. Choices were labeled as hedonistic (i.e., selfish) otherwise. 
 
Behavioral definition of healthy choice. In the Dietary Choice Task, we separately examined 
trials requiring a tradeoff between taste and health (i.e. conflict trials where a food was rated 
either as healthy but not tasty, or as unhealthy but tasty) as well as trials with no tradeoff (i.e., 
no-conflict trials where a food was both tasty and healthy, or both unhealthy and not tasty). In 
both cases, we label specific decisions as normative (i.e., healthy) if the participant either 
accepted a healthy food, or rejected an unhealthy food. All other choices were labeled as 
hedonistic (i.e., unhealthy).  
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Computational Model Fitting 
We used a Bayesian model-fitting approach to identify best-fitting model parameters of the 
anDDM (i.e. attribute weight parameters, threshold B, non-decision time ndt, auto-excitation 
parameter 𝛾 and lateral inhibition parameter 𝜁) to account for choices and RTs, separately for 
each participant in each study and (in Studies 2 and 3) each condition. More specifically, we 
obtained estimates of the posterior distribution of each parameter using the Differentially-
Evolving Monte-Carlo Markov Chain (DEMCMC) sampling method and MATLAB35 code 
developed by 36. This method uses the anDDM described above (Computational Model 
Simulations) to simulate the likelihood of the observed data (i.e. choices and RTs) given a 
specific combination of parameters, and then uses this likelihood to construct a Bayesian 
estimate of the posterior distribution of the likelihood of the parameters given the data. 
 
For each individual fit, we used 3 x N chains, where N is the number of free parameters (7 in 
Studies 1 and 2, 6 in Study 3), using uninformative priors and constraining parameter values as 
shown in Supplementary Table S1 based on previous work22,23 and theoretical bounds. To 
construct the estimated posterior distributions of each parameter, we sampled 1500 iterations per 
chain after an initial burn-in period of 500 samples. Best-fitting values of each parameter were 
computed as the mean over the posterior distribution for that parameter. These parameter values 
(see Supplementary Table S1) were used to simulate trial-by-trial activation across the two 
neuronal pools for use in the GLMs described below. Importantly, parameter values identified by 
this fitting procedure suggested that the model provided a good fit to behavior across all three 
studies (Supplementary Figure 2). 
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Neuroimaging Analyses 
 
GLM 1a: Correlates of the anDDM (Study 1). We used GLM 1a to identify brain regions where 
activation varied parametrically according to the predictions of the anDDM in Study 1 (Altruistic 
Choice Task). To this end, we determined that the best BOLD approximation of the anDDM was 
a parametric modulator with a value consisting of the sum total of the simulated response across 
both pools of neurons, averaged over all simulations terminating in the observed choice on that 
trial within ±250ms of the observed RT, and modulating a boxcar function with onset at the 
beginning of the choice period and having a duration of the RT on that trial (see Supplemental 
Methods for further detail on selecting the best regressor). To simulate expected anDDM 
activation on each trial, we generated 5000 simulations using the best-fitting parameters for each 
participant and the estimated value of the proposal and default on each trial (i.e., wSelf*$Self + 
wOther*$Other + wFairness*|$Self - $Other|). 
 
Then, for each subject we estimated a GLM with AR(1) and the following regressors of interest: 
R1) A boxcar function for the choice period on all trials (duration = RT on that trial). R2) R1 
modulated by the subject’s stated preference on that trial (1 = Strong No, 4 = Strong Yes). R3) 
R1 modulated by the estimated activation of the anDDM on that trial. R4) A boxcar function of 3 
seconds specifying the outcome period on each trial. R5) R4 modulated by the outcome for the 
self on each trial. R6) R4 modulated by the outcome for the partner on each trial. R7) A boxcar 
function (duration = 4 seconds) specifying missed trials. Parametric modulators were 
orthogonalized to each other in SPM. Regressors of non-interest included six motion regressors 
as well as session constants. 
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We then computed subject-level contrasts of the anDDM parametric modulator (R3) against an 
implicit baseline. Finally, to test the hypothesis that anDDM responses might correlate with 
activation in the dlPFC, we subjected this contrast to a one-sample t-test against zero, 
thresholded at a voxel-wise P < .001, and a cluster-defining threshold of P < .05, small-volume 
corrected within a 10-mm spherical region of interest (ROI) centered on the peak coordinates of 
activity for the contrast of normative (healthy) vs. hedonistic (unhealthy) choice in a previous 
study of self-control in dieters1. Regions lying outside of this ROI were also identified at a voxel-
level P < .001 uncorrected and a whole-brain cluster-corrected level of P < .05. 
 
GLM 1b: Correlates of the anDDM (Study 2). GLM1b was similar to GLM1a, with the 
exception that we estimated regressors for each condition separately. R1, R4, and R7 were 
boxcar functions representing the choice period for the Natural, Ethics, and Partner conditions, 
respectively. R2, R5, and R9 modulated R1, R4 and R7 with the decision value on that trial. R3, 
R6, and R9 modulated R1, R4, and R7 using the estimated activation of the anDDM on that trial. 
A single contrast representing neural correlates of the anDDM was constructed by combining R3, 
R6 and R9 at the subject-level and performing a one-sample t-test against zero, thresholded at a 
voxel-wise P < .001 and a small-volume cluster-corrected level of P < .05 within the dlPFC ROI 
described above. 
 
GLM1c: Correlates of the anDDM (Study 3). GLM1c was similar to GLM1b, but applied to the 
Food Choice Task. R1, R4, and R7 were boxcar functions representing Natural, Taste, and 
Health focus conditions. R2, R5, and R8 were parametric modulators representing the decision 
value on that trial, and R3, R6, and R9 were modulators consisting of anDDM activity simulated 
using healthiness and tastiness ratings as attributes. Similar to Studies 1 and 2, correlates of the 
anDDM were identified in this study thresholded at a voxel-wise P < .001 and a small-volume 
cluster-corrected level of P < .05 within the dlPFC ROI described above. 
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ROI definition. Based on GLMs 1a, b and c, we identified a region of the left dlPFC consistently 
associated with the anDDM across all three studies through a three-way conjunction analysis 
using the imcalc function in SPM12, with each individual study map thresholded at P < .05, 
small-volume corrected, and a minimum overlap of > 5 contiguous voxels. Outside of this ROI, 
we also identified regions significant across all three studies at P < .05, whole-brain corrected. 
This identified just three regions, located in the left dlPFC, left IFG, and dACC (Figure 4 and 
Supplemental Figures S3 and S4). We then interrogated activation within these regions 
specifically for the contrast of normative vs. hedonistic choice, using GLMs 2a, b and c, as 
specified below. 
 
GLM 2a: Generous vs. Selfish decisions in Altruistic Choice (Study 1). We used GLM 2a to test 
predictions about activation on trials in which subjects chose generously or selfishly. The 
analysis was carried out in three steps. 
 
First, for each subject we estimated a GLM with AR(1) and the following regressors of interest: 
R1) A boxcar function for the choice period on trials when the subject chose selfishly. R2) R1 
modulated by the value of 4-point preference response (i.e., Strong No to Strong Yes) at the time 
of choice. R3) A boxcar function for the choice period on trials when the subject chose 
generously. R4) R3 modulated by behavioral preference. Regressors of non-interest included six 
motion regressors as well as session constants. 
 
Second, we computed the subject-level contrast image [R3 – R1], which identified regions with 
differential response for generous compared to selfish choices. Seven subjects were excluded 
from this analysis for having fewer than 4 generous choices over the 180 trials. We computed the 
average value of this contrast within the three anDDM ROIs specified above. As a 
supplementary analysis, we also asked whether any voxels beyond these regions demonstrated a 
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significant effect, using a whole-brain analysis thresholded at P < .001, uncorrected (see 
Supplementary Table S3). 
 
GLM 2b: Generous vs. Selfish decisions in Altruistic Choice (Study 2). We used GLM 2b to test 
predictions about activation on trials in which the subject chose generously or selfishly in Study 
2, and to compare how instructed attention altered these responses. All unreported details are as 
in GLM1a. Regressors of interest consisted of the following: R1) A boxcar function for the 
choice period on trials when the subject chose selfishly in Natural Focus trials. R2) R1 
modulated by the value of 4-point preference response (i.e., Strong No to Strong Yes) expressed 
at the time of choice. R3) A boxcar function for the choice period on trials when the subject 
chose generously in Natural Focus trials. R4) R3 modulated by behavioral preference. R5-R8) 
Analogous regressors for generous and selfish choices during Ethics Focus trials. R9-12) 
Analogous regressors for generous and selfish choices during Partner Focus trials. R13-15) A 
boxcar function of 3 sec duration signaling the outcome period for Natural, Ethics, or Partner 
Focus trials. R16-18) R13-15 modulated by the amount received by the subject at outcome. R19-
21) R13-15 modulated by the amount received by the partner at outcome.  
 
We then computed the subject-level contrast images [R3 – R1], [R7 – R5], and [R11 – R9], 
which identified regions with differential response for generous compared to selfish choices in 
each condition. We computed the average value of each of these contrasts within the three 
anDDM ROIs specified above. As a supplementary analysis, we also asked whether any voxels 
beyond these regions demonstrated a significant effect in any condition, using a whole-brain 
analysis thresholded at P < .001, uncorrected (see Supplementary Table S3). 
 
GLM 2c: Healthy vs. Unhealthy decisions in the Food Choice Task (Study 3). GLM 2c was 
analogous to GLM 2b, but examined healthy vs. unhealthy choices in the Dietary Choice Task, 
separately for conflicted trials (i.e. healthy but not tasty foods and tasty but unhealthy foods) and 
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for unconflicted trials (i.e. healthy and tasty foods or unhealthy and not tasty foods). It included 
the following regressors of interest: R1) A boxcar function for the choice period on conflicted 
trials when the subject made a healthy choice (i.e., accepted a healthy-but-not-tasty or rejected a 
tasty-but-unhealthy food) in Natural Focus trials. R2) R1 modulated by the value of behaviorally 
expressed preference at the time of choice. R3) A boxcar function for the choice period on 
conflicted trials when the subject made an unhealthy choice in Natural trials. R4) R3 modulated 
by behavioral preference. R5-8) Analogous regressors for healthy and unhealthy choices during 
conflicted Taste Focus trials. R9-12) Analogous regressors for healthy and unhealthy choices 
during Health Focus trials. R13) Healthy choices on unconflicted Natural Focus trials. R14) 
Unhealthy choices on unconflicted Natural Focus trials. R15-16) R13 and R14 modulated by 
preference. R17-R20) Analogous regressors for healthy and unhealthy choice on unconflicted 
trials in the Health Focus trials. R21-R24) Analogous regressors for healthy and unhealthy 
choice on unconflicted trials in the Taste Focus trials. Subject-level contrast images of healthy vs. 
unhealthy choices, in each condition separately and separately for conflicted vs. unconflicted 
trials, were computed in a manner identical to GLM2b. We analyzed activation for these 
contrasts specifically within the three ROIs identified as anDDM regions. As a supplementary 
analysis, we also report results at the whole-brain level at P < .001, uncorrected, in Table S3. 
Unreported details are as in GLM 2a.  
 
 
Data Availability. Behavioral data and all analysis code are available on the Open Science 
Framework at	[link	released	after	acceptance	for	publication]. Neuroimaging data are 
available upon request to the authors. 
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